Abstract. Although security is a crucial issue for information systems, traditionally, it is considered after the definition of the system. This approach often leads to problems, which most of the times translate into security vulnerabilities.
Introduction
As information systems (IS) become more and more critical in every aspect of the human society, from the health sector to military, so does the demand to secure these systems. This is mainly because private information is stored in computer systems and without security, organisations (and individuals) are not willing to share information or even use the technology.
Consider, for example, a health and social care information system containing health data of different individuals. Security in such a system, as in any health and social care information system, is very important since security breaches might result in medical history to be revealed, and revealing a medical history could have serious consequences for particular individuals.
Software Engineers consider security as a non-functional requirement, but unlike other non-functional requirements, such as reliability and performance, security has not been fully integrated within the development lifecycle and it is still mainly considered after the design of the system. However, security introduces not only quality characteristics but also constraints under which the system must operate. Ignoring such constraints during the development process could lead to serious problems [1] , since security mechanisms would have to be fitted into a pre-existing design, therefore leading to design challenges that usually translate into software vulnerabilities [33] .
We believe that security should be considered during the whole development process and it should be defined together with the requirements specification. By considering security only in certain stages of the development process, more likely, security needs will conflict with functional requirements of the system. Taking security into account along with the functional requirements throughout the development stages helps to limit 3 the cases of conflict, by identifying them very early in the system development, and find ways to overcome them. On the other hand, adding security as an afterthought not only increases the chances of such a conflict to exist, but it requires huge amount of money and valuable time to overcome it, once they have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the system is needed).
However, current methodologies for IS development do not meet the needs for resolving the security related IS problems [34] , and fail to provide evidence of integrating successfully security concerns throughout the whole range of the development process.
There are at least two reasons for the lack of support for security engineering [20] :
1. Security requirements are generally difficult to analyse and model. A major problem in analysing non-functional requirements is that there is a need to separate functional and non-functional requirements yet, at the same time, individual non-functional requirements may relate to one or more functional requirements. If the non-functional requirements are stated separately from the functional requirements, it is sometimes difficult to see the correspondence between them. If stated with the functional requirements, it may be difficult to separate functional and non-functional considerations.
2. Developers lack expertise for secure software development. Many developers, who are not security specialists, must develop systems that require security features. Without an appropriate methodology to guide those developers on the development processes, it is likely that they will fail to produce effective solutions [23] . 4 In this paper we present an approach that integrates security and systems engineering, using the same concepts and notations, throughout the entire system development process. This work falls within the context of the Tropos methodology [6, 8] in which security requirements are considered as an integral part of the whole development process.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the Tropos methodology describing briefly the methodology stages and its concepts. Section 3 describes the security extensions to the Tropos methodology to enable it to model security issues, whereas section 4 describes a health and social care information system that is used as a case study throughout the paper. Section 5 illustrates how our approach integrates security and systems engineering within the Tropos development process and Section 6 relates our work to the literature by providing an overview of related work.
Finally, section 7 provides directions for future work and it concludes the paper.
Tropos methodology
Tropos is a development methodology tailored to describe both the organisational environment of a system and the system itself. Tropos is characterised by three key aspects [6, 28] . Firstly, it deals with all the phases of system requirements analysis and system design and implementation 2 adopting a uniform and homogeneous way.
Secondly, Tropos pays great deal of attention to the early requirements analysis that precedes the specification of the perspective requirements, emphasising the need to understand the how and why the intended system would meet the organisational goals.
This allows for a more refined analysis of the system dependencies, leading to a better 2 In this paper we do not consider the implementation stage. Readers interested in this stage can refer to [7] . 5 treatment not only of the system functional requirements but also of its non-functional requirements, such as security, reliability, and performance [28] . Thirdly, Tropos is based on the idea of building a model of the system that is incrementally refined and extended from a conceptual level to executable artefacts, by means of a sequence of transformational steps [5] .
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [35] , which uses the concepts of actors, goals, tasks, resources and social dependencies for defining the obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors (dependers). Actors have strategic goals and intentions within the system or the organisation and represent (social) agents (organisational, human or software), roles or positions (represent a set of roles). A goal represents the strategic interests of an actor. In Tropos we differentiate between hard (only goals hereafter) and soft goals. The latter having no clear definition or criteria for deciding whether they are satisfied or not [35] . A task represents a way of doing something.
Thus, for example, a task can be executed in order to satisfy a goal. A resource represents a physical or an informational entity while a dependency between two actors indicates that one actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource. Figure 1a shows the graphical representation of the abovementioned concepts. Because of these concepts, in Tropos, the system (as well as its environment) is seen as a set of actors, who depend on other actors to help them fulfil their goals. The type of the dependency describes the nature of an agreement (called dependum) between dependee and depender. Goal dependencies represent delegation of responsibility for fulfilling a goal; softgoal dependencies are similar to goal dependencies, but their fulfilment cannot be defined precisely; task dependencies are used in situations where the dependee is required to perform a given activity; and resource dependencies require the dependee to provide a resource to the depender. Figure 1b illustrates a graphical representation of a goal dependency.
Tropos covers four main software development phases:
Early Requirements analysis, concerned with the understanding of a problem by studying an existing organisational setting. The output of this phase is an organisational model, which includes relevant actors, their respective dependencies and the security constraints imposed to those actors.
Late requirements analysis, where the system-to-be is described within its operational environment, along with relevant functions and security requirements; this description models the system as a (small) number of actors, which have a number of dependencies and security constraints. These dependencies define the system's functional requirements, while the security constraints define the system's security requirements.
Architectural design, where the system's global architecture is defined in terms of subsystems, interconnected through data and control flows. Within the framework, subsystems are represented as actors and data/control interconnections are represented as (system) actor dependencies. In addition, during this stage, different architectural 7 styles are analysed taking into account security and other non-functional requirements of the system and secure capabilities are identified and assigned to the different actors of the system to satisfy the secure entities.
Detailed design, where each architectural component is further defined in terms of inputs, outputs, control, and the security aspects analysed in the previous stages. For this stage, Tropos is using elements of Agent Unified Modelling Language (AUML) [3] to complement the features of i*.
The security extensions
Although Tropos was not conceived with security on mind, a set of security concepts, such as security constraint, secure entities and secure dependencies have been proposed [25] to enable it to consider security aspects throughout the whole development process.
To enable developers to adequately capture security requirements the concept of constraint [25] is introduced and it is extended it with respect to security. In addition, the Tropos concepts of dependency, goal, task, resource, and capability are also extended with security in mind. All these concepts are defined within the Tropos project as secure entities.
In the context of our work, a security constraint is defined as a restriction related to security issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability, of an information system that it can influence the analysis and design of the system under development by restricting some alternative design solutions, by conflicting with some of the requirements of the system, or by refining some of the system's objectives. 8 A security constraint contributes to a higher level of abstraction, meaning that security constraints do not represent specific security protocol restrictions 3 , which restrict the design with the use of a particular implementation language. This higher level of abstraction allows for a generalised design free of models biased to particular implementation languages.
Moreover, the term secure entity is used within the context of our work to describe goals, tasks, and resources related to the security of the system. In other words, a secure entity represents a secure goal, a secure task or a secure resource.
Secure goals are introduced to the system to help in the achievement of a security constraint. A secure goal does not particularly define how the security constraint can be achieved, since (as in the definition of goal, see [35] ) alternatives can be considered.
However, this is possible through a secure task, since a task specifies a way of doing something [35] . Thus, a secure task represents a particular way for satisfying a secure The only difference in the representation of non-secure Tropos concepts and secure concepts is an S (Security) within brackets that appears in the beginning of the security concept description to indicate that the concept is related to the security of the information system.
A secure dependency [25] introduces security constraint(s), proposed either by the depender or the dependee in order to successfully satisfy the dependency. Both the depender and the dependee must agree for the fulfilment of the security constraint in order for the secure dependency to be valid. That means the depender expects from the dependee to satisfy the security constraint(s) and also that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying the security constraint(s).
Secure Tropos differentiates three different types of secure dependency:
• A Dependee Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the dependee and the dependee introduces security constraint(s) for the dependency.
• A Depender Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the dependee and the depender introduces security constraint(s) for the dependency.
• A Double Secure Dependency, in which the depender depends on the dependee and both the depender and the dependee introduce security constraints for the dependency. 
Case Study
This section introduces the case study that will be used in the rest of this paper to describe the security analysis process throughout the different stages of the Tropos methodology.
We consider the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system [27] , an integrated health and social care information system for the effective care of older people. Security is a very important factor in the development of the electronic single England. This is due to the fact that in cases where patients (in the case of the eSAP older people) do not trust the security of the system, they will refuse to provide complete information about their health and social care needs, and this could lead to many problems such as wrong assessment of needs, which could lead to wrong care plans.
Therefore privacy of health and social care information, such as the health and social care plans used in the electronic single assessment process, is the number one security concern in such a system. According to Good Medical Practice, patients have a right to expect that you will not pass on any personal information, which you learn in the course of your professional duties unless they agree. In addition to that, the English government and health and social care unions have agreed that electronic health care
records should be at least as well protected as the paper ones.
Other important concerns are integrity and availability. Integrity assures that information is not corrupted and availability ensures the information is always available to authorised health and social care professionals. If assessment information is corrupted or it is not available the care provided to the older people (in the case of the eSAP) by the health and social care professionals will not be efficient or accurate.
Therefore, it is necessary to find ways to help towards the privacy, the integrity and the availability of personal health and social care information.
It must be noticed that, in our example, many functionalities of the system are omitted, since our aim is not to explore the complexity of the system, but rather to demonstrate how the Tropos methodology integrates security and systems engineering. is contained in A's; (6) Availability, the information must be available whenever a person included in the access control list requires any information.
The Development Process

Early Requirements
During the early requirements stage, the goals, dependencies and the security constraints between the stakeholders (actors) are modelled with the aid of an actors'
diagram [28] .
In such a diagram, actors (graphically represented as circles) are modelled together with their goals (represented as ovals), soft-goals (represented as bubbles), their 13 dependencies (represented as links between the actors indicating the dependum 4 ) and their security constraints (modelled as clouds).
In the actor's diagram, imposed security constraints are expressed in high-level statements.
For the eSAP case study, we consider the following actors (see Figure 4) Professional: the health and/or social care professional; When the stakeholders, their goals, the dependencies between them, and the security constraints have been identified, the next step of this phase is to analyse in more depth each actor's goals and the security constraints imposed to them. In addition, secure entities are introduced to help towards the satisfaction of the imposed security constraints. In this example, since the paper is focused on the secure Tropos and not in Tropos in general, we focus only in the analysis of the security constraints, and not in the goal or task analysis of each individual actor.
To model this, goal diagrams are used. In a goal diagram, each actor is represented as a dashed-line balloon within which the actor's goals and dependencies are analysed. 15 The nodes of the diagram represent goals, soft-goals, and/or tasks whereas the links identify the different kinds of relationships between those nodes. Moreover, these links can be connected with external dependencies (identified in the actor diagram) when the reasoning of the analysis goes beyond the actor's boundary [35] .
The analysis of the security constraints starts by identifying which goals of the actor they restrict. This case is known as security constraint assignment. The assignment of a security constraint to a goal is indicated using a constraint link (a link that has the "restricts" tag). In addition, different alternatives can be considered for achieving the goals and the security goals of the stakeholders. 
Late Requirements
In the late requirements stage, the functional, security, and other non-functional requirements for the system-to-be are described. The system-to-be is introduced as one or more actors who have a number of dependencies with the other actors of the organization (defined during the early requirements stage) and it (the system) contributes to the goals of the stakeholders.
More specifically, from the security point of view, during the late requirements analysis stage, security constraints are imposed to the system-to-be. These constraints are further analysed and security goals and entities necessary for the system to guarantee the security constraints are identified. 17 In the presented case study, one of the main aims of the Department of Health is to allow older people to get more involved in their care and also help professionals provide more efficient care. For this reason, the Department of Health depends on the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system to automate care.
Therefore, the eSAP system has been introduced as another actor that receives the responsibility for the fulfilment of some of the goals identified during the early requirements analysis for the actors of the system. In other words, some goals that the actors of the system cannot fulfil or are better fulfilled by the eSAP system are delegated to the eSAP System.
To satisfy all the delegated dependencies, the main goal of the eSAP system has been identified as to Automate Care. By performing a means-end analysis, presented in From the security point of view, and taking into consideration the security policy (presented in the previous section) there are three main security constraints imposed, by the desired security features of the system Privacy, Integrity and Availability, to the eSAP's main goal. Each of these secure constraints can be satisfied with the aid of one or more secure goals. For example, the Keep System Data Private security constraint can be fulfilled by blocking access to the system, by allowing access only from a central computer, or by ensuring system privacy. However, the two first contribute negatively to the usability of the system, i.e. the system will be secure but it will not be used. On the other hand, the Ensure System Privacy secure goal is considered the best solution since it provides security to the system and it doesn't affect (dramatically) its usability.
Thus, for the eSAP to satisfy its security constraints the following secure goals have been identified as shown in figure 6 Ensure System Privacy, Ensure Data Integrity, evaluate the different alternatives could be to use the measures of complexity and criticality [13] . Complexity represents the effort required from an actor for achieving a (security) task, while criticality represents how the (security) goals of the actor will be affected if a (security) task is not achieved. Thus, by knowing how complex and how critical the different alternatives are, we can decide which alternative is the best solution.
Architectural Design
The architectural design phase defines the system's global architecture. During architectural design the first step is to identify the overall architectural organization by selecting among alternative architectural styles 6 using as criteria the non-functional requirements of the system identified in the previous stage.
However, quality characteristics (non-functional requirements) are difficult to measure since it is difficult to get empirical evidence during the design stages. 20 Nevertheless, a technique is required to allow developers to reason about alternative design solutions according to the security requirements of their system.
For this reason, we have developed an analysis technique to enable developers to select among alternative architectural styles using as criteria the non-functional requirements of the multiagent system under development.
Our analysis process is based on an independent probabilistic model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by Giorgini et al. [14] . In our example, satisfiability represents the probability that the non-functional requirement will be satisfied. Thus, the evaluation results in contribution relationships from the architectural styles to the probability of satisfying the non-functional requirements of the system identified in the late requirements stage.
To express the contribution of each style to the satisfiability of each non-functional requirement of the system, a weight is assigned. Weights take a value between 0 and 1.
For example, 0.1 means the probability that the architectural style will satisfy the nonfunctional requirement is very low (the style is not suitable for satisfying the requirement). On the other hand, a weight of 0.9 means the probability that the architectural style will satisfy the non-functional requirement is very high (the style is suitable for satisfying the requirement).
The analysis involves the identification of more specific non-functional requirements, by refining the ones identified during the late requirements stage, and the evaluation of different architectural styles against those requirements. It must be noticed that the refinement of the security requirements took place during the late requirements analysis with the identification of secure tasks, so from the security point of view, the alternative architectural styles are evaluated against those tasks.
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In the eSAP system, the security of the system is one of the most important factors and it is the criterion that will guide the selection process, in this example, for the appropriate architectural style. As derived from the analysis of the eSAP, security is decomposed to privacy, integrity and availability.
We consider two architectural styles for our analysis, a hierarchical styleclient/server -and a mobile code style -mobile agents. We decided to consider those two since client/server is the most frequently encountered of the architectural styles for network-based applications [11] , while mobile agents form a growing and quite different architectural style. In client/server style, a node is acting as a server that represents a process that provides services to other nodes, which act as clients. The server listens for requests upon the offered services. The basic form of client/server does not constrain how application state is partitioned between client and server components [11] . Client/server architectural style is also referred to by the mechanisms used for the connector implementation such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC) [11] . RPC is appropriate for client/server architectural styles since the client can issue a request and wait for the server' s response before continuing its own processing. On the other side, in mobile agents style, mobility is used in order to dynamically change the distance between the processing and source of data or destination of results. The computational component is moved to the remote site, along with its state, the code it needs and possibly some data required to perform the task [11] .
As shown in Figure 7 , each of the two styles satisfies differently each of the nonfunctional requirements of the system. The latter approach is more scalable since the required filtering is distributed and can be performed close to the information sources.
As concluded from our analysis (illustrated in Figure 7 ), the client/server style satisfies more the privacy requirements of the system than the mobile agents style. This is mainly because mobility is involved in the mobile agents style. Therefore, although protection of a server from mobile agents, or generally mobile code, is an evolution of security mechanisms applied in other architectural styles, such as client/server; the mechanisms focused on the protection of the mobile agents from the server cannot, so 23 far, prevent malicious behaviour from occurring but may be able to detect it [15] .
Consider for example, the Check Information Flow secure task of the eSAP. The information flow property is more easily damaged by employing mobile agents (weight 0.4) since possible platforms that a mobile agent could visit might expose sensitive information from the agent [15, 16] . In the case of the client/server style (weight 0.8)
sensitive information is stored in the server and existing well-proven security measures could be taken to satisfy the information flow attribute.
On the other hand, the mobile agents style satisfies more, than the client/server style, the availability requirements of the system. Consider for example the recoverability secure task of the eSAP. The mobile agents style contributes with a weight of 0.8. This is due to the fact that mobile agents adapt dynamically. Mobile agents can react to changes in their environment and maintain an optimal configuration for solving a particular problem [21] .
From the integrity point of view, the client/server style contributes better than the mobile agents style. In the mobile agents style mobility is involved and therefore checking the integrity of the data becomes a more difficult task. This is because mobile agents cannot prevent a malicious agent platform from tampering with their code, state or data, but they can only take measures to detect this tampering [15, 16] . Moreover, in the mobile agent style, the integrity of both the local and remote agent platforms must be checked.
From the above, it can be concluded that the client/server styles contributes more towards the privacy and integrity of the eSAP, whereas the mobile agents style contributes more towards the availability.
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It is worth mentioning that the weights of the contribution links reported in figure 7 , of each architectural style to the different non-functional requirements of the system, have been assigned after reviewing different studies [2, 4] , evaluations [11] , and comparisons [29] involving the architectural styles. We must also note that figure 7 represents a partial illustration of the comparison process. For example, we have omitted, in order to keep the figure simple and easy to understand, the contributions and the conflicts amongst the different non-functional requirements. For example, although privacy contributes negative to the mobility requirement, this is not shown in the figure.
When the contribution weights for each architectural style to the different nonfunctional requirements of the system have been assigned, the best-suited architectural style is decided. This decision involves the categorization of the non-functional requirements according to the importance to the system and the identification of the architectural style that best satisfies the most important non-functional requirement using a propagation algorithm, such as the one presented by Giorgini et al. [14] .
In our example, privacy and integrity are more important (in the case of the eSAP) than availability (most of the times, not real-time information is needed). As a result, the client/server style has been chosen as the architectural style of the system
In the case that two or more non-functional requirements are of the same importance, the presented approach can be integrated with other analysis techniques, such as the SAAM [18] , to indicate which architectural style is best suited for the system-to-be.
As mentioned by Castro et al. [8] , an interesting decision that comes up during the architectural design is whether fulfilment of an actor's obligations will be accomplished through assistance from other actors, through delegation, or through decomposition of the actor into component actors. Thus, when various architectural styles have been 25 evaluated, and one has been chosen, the next step of the architectural design stage involves the introduction of new actors and their dependencies, as well as the decomposition of existing actors into sub-actors and the delegation of some (security)
responsibilities from the existing actors to the introduced sub-actors.
In the presented example, the eSAP actor is decomposed, as shown in figure 8 , to internal actors and the responsibility for the fulfilment of the eSAP's goals is delegated to these actors. Each of those actors can be furthered decomposed to model more precisely the actor's goals and how the actor will achieve these goals. For instance, the Assessment Synthesiser sub-actor of the Assessment Evaluator, can be furthered analysed as shown in Figure 10 . The main goal of the Assessment Synthesiser is to Provide an Assessment Evaluation. To satisfy this goal, the Assessment Evaluator has to synthesise any information related to the assessment. To achieve this, the Assessment Evaluator must obtain the problems associated with the assessment, the proposed actions required to deal with the identified problems, the skills required to carry out these actions, and the available professionals that demonstrate the required skills. However, the Assessment Evaluator cannot achieve these tasks without help. Therefore, the Assessment Evaluator depends on the Assessment Analyser, the Actions Manager, the Skills
Manager and the Professional Database Manager respectively to satisfy the above mentioned tasks.
The last step of the architectural design aims to identify capabilities for each of the actors by taking into account dependency relationships of the actors. A capability represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and executing a plan for the fulfilment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in presence of a specific event [28] . For example, the Assessment Evaluator should have capabilities such as get assessment information, get proposed actions, and provide assessment evaluation.
However, the process of identifying capabilities for each actor has been extensively described in the literature [6, 26, 28] and thus it is not described here.
From the security point of view, secure capabilities are introduced to the actors to guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints. A secure capability represents the ability of an actor/agent to achieve a secure goal, carry out a secure task and/or deliver a secure resource.
For example, as identified in the early requirements analysis, for the eSAP system to satisfy the Ensure System Privacy secure goal, only encrypted data transfers across the network should be allowed. Therefore, the Assessment Information resource sent 29 from the Professional to the Assessment Analyser (as illustrated in figure 9 ) must be encrypted. Because of this, the Professional actor should be provided with capabilities to encrypt and decrypt data. Later in the detailed design, each agent's capabilities are further specified and then coded during the implementation phase
Detailed Design
During the detailed design each component of the system, identified in the previous stages, is further specified. In Tropos the detailed design stage is based on the specifications resulted from the architectural design stage, and the reasons for a given component can be traced back to the early requirements analysis. In particular, from the security point of view, during the detailed design the developers specify in detail the actors' capabilities and interactions taking into account the security aspects derived from the previous steps of the analysis.
For the detailed design stage, Tropos adapts a subset of the AUML diagrams proposed in [3] . These are:
• Capability Diagrams. We use AUML activity diagrams to model a (secure) capability or a set of capabilities for a specific actor. In each capability diagram, the starting state is represented by external events, activity nodes model plans, transition arcs model events, and beliefs are modelled as objects. For instance, in our case study, the Receive Assessment Evaluation capability (see figure 9) of the Professional actor is illustrated in figure 11 . The Professional receives (external event -EE) the Assessment Evaluation from the eSAP System. She/he then evaluates the Assessment Evaluation and either accepts it or rejects it. Guard provides access to the eSAP system if authentication clearance is provided. To indicate these constraints, we introduce security rules. These are similar to the business rules that UML has for defining constraints on the diagrams. Graphically, security rules are placed on Notes and attached to the related structure as shown in figure 13 . 
Related Work
Literature provides only few approaches in considering security requirements as an integral part of the whole software development process.
Chung applies a process-oriented approach [9] to represent security requirements as potentially conflicting or harmonious goals and using them during the development of 33 software systems. The proposed framework, which is called the NFR (Non-Functional Requirements) framework, represents and uses security requirements as a class of nonfunctional requirements and it allows developers to consider design decisions and relate these decisions to the represented non-functional requirements.
Rohrig [30] proposes an approach to re-use existing business process descriptions for the analysis of security requirements and the derivation of necessary security measures.
The proposed approach consists of four main steps. During the first step, the general security objectives of the business process are defined, whereas during the second step the security objectives of all the constructs, such as actors and artefacts, are examined.
The third step examines whether these specifications are consistent and during the fourth step a list of necessary security measures for each process component is generated.
In addition, Jurgens proposes UMLsec [17] , an extension of the Unified Modelling Language (UML), to include modelling of security related features, such as confidentiality and access control. In his work, Jurgens uses four different UML diagrams; class diagrams to ensure that exchange of data obeys security levels, statechart diagrams to prevent indirect information flow from high to low values within an object, interaction diagrams to ensure correctness of security critical interactions between objects and deployment diagrams to ensure that security requirements on communication are met by the physical layer.
Lodderstedt et al. [22] also extend UML to model security. In their work, they present a security modelling language called SecureUML [22] . They describe how UML can be used to specify information related to access control in the overall design of an 34 application and how this information can be used to automatically generate complete access control infrastructures.
McDermott and Fox adapt use cases [23] to capture and analyse security requirements, and they call the adaption an abuse case model [23] . An abuse case is defined as a specification of a type of complete interaction between a system and one or more actors, where the results of the interaction are harmful to the system, one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders of the system [23] .
Sindre and Opdahl [32] define the concept of a misuse case, the inverse of a use case, which describes a function that the system should not allow. They also define the concept of a mis-actor as someone who intentionally or accidentally initiates a misuse case and whom the system should not support in doing so. In their approach security is considered by analysing security related misuse cases.
The concept of obstacle is used in the KAOS framework [10] to capture undesired properties of the system, and define and relate security requirements to other system requirements. In this work, two set of techniques, based on a temporal logic formalisation, are employed to reason about obstacles to the satisfaction of goals, requirements, and assumptions elaborated in the requirements engineering process.
These (above-mentioned) approaches provide a first step towards the integration of security and software engineering and have been found helpful in modelling security requirements. However, they only guide the way security can be handled within a certain stage of the software development process. For example, McDermott and Fox's approach is used only during the requirements analysis, whereas Jurgen's analysis take place in a fairly low level and it is suited to a more operational analysis. In other words, Jurgen's approach is only applicable during the design stage. 35 Differently than them, this paper proposes an approach that covers the whole development process using the same concepts and notations. As mentioned in the Introduction, considering security issues throughout the development process helps to limit the cases of conflict, by identifying them very early in the system development, and find ways to overcome them.
Moreover, some of the above mentioned approaches only deal with specific security issues. For example, UMLSec is focused more in access control policies and how these policies can be integrated into a model-driven software development process. Although such an analysis is important, it is very specific and it is applicable only on the design stage of the modelling process. In contrast, the approach presented in this paper considers the whole range of security issues, from access control to authentication and integrity.
In addition to the above approaches, existing formal methods [7, 31] support the verification of a security protocol, which has already been specified [24] . However, such approaches are only applicable by security specialists and cannot be easily applied by software developers. On the other hand, the approach presented in this paper uses concepts and notations derived mainly from the requirements engineering area and as a result can be applied by software developers with minimum knowledge of security engineering.
It is worth mentioning that the technique presented for the evaluation of the different architectural styles, is similar to the evaluation process for organisational styles proposed by Kolp et al. [19] . The main difference is that Kolp's process is based on a qualitative reasoning, while the technique proposed by this research is based on an 36 independent probabilistic model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by Giorgini et al. [14] .
Conclusions and future work
Although Security is an important issue in the development of information systems, currently the common approach towards the inclusion of security within a system is to identify security requirements after the definition of a system. However, as pointed earlier, this approach leads many times to problems and systems full of security vulnerabilities. It should be possible to eliminate such problems through the integration of security concerns at every phase of the system development. To achieve this goal, methodologies must provide developers (even those not expert on security) guidance through a systematic process, which will integrate security and systems engineering at every phase of the system development cycle.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a process that integrates security and systems engineering, using the same concepts and notations, in the entire system development process. The integrated, in Tropos, security process is one of analysing the security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of security constraints imposed to the system and the stakeholders, identify secure entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints and assign capabilities to the system to help towards the satisfaction of the secure entities. The presented approach is characterised by five key ideas. Firstly by considering the overall software development process it is easy to identify security requirements at the early requirements stage and propagate them until the implementation stage. This introduces a security-oriented paradigm to the software engineering process. Secondly, Tropos allows a hierarchical 37 approach towards security. Security is defined in different levels of complexity, which allows the software engineer a better understanding while advancing through the process. Thirdly, iteration allows the re-definition of security requirements in different levels therefore providing a better integration with system functionality. Fourthly, consideration of the organisational environment facilitates the understanding of the security needs in terms of the security policy. In addition, functional and non-functional requirements are defined together however a clear distinction is provided.
However, this work is by no means complete. Future work includes providing a process to verify the security of the developed information systems during the design stage and also applying our process to different case studies to refine it. We also aim to integrate our extensions to the Formal Tropos [12] specification language to enable us to formally evaluate it. The formal part of the work will also allow us to prove and check the properties of the system.
